Foreign Policy During the Vietnam War by Menebhi, Syeda
Rhode Island College 
Digital Commons @ RIC 
Master's Theses, Dissertations, Graduate 
Research and Major Papers Overview 
Master's Theses, Dissertations, Graduate 
Research and Major Papers 
5-2014 
Foreign Policy During the Vietnam War 
Syeda Menebhi 
Rhode Island College, smenebhi@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/etd 
 Part of the Asian History Commons, and the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Menebhi, Syeda, "Foreign Policy During the Vietnam War" (2014). Master's Theses, Dissertations, 
Graduate Research and Major Papers Overview. 94. 
https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/etd/94 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses, Dissertations, Graduate Research 
and Major Papers at Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses, Dissertations, 
Graduate Research and Major Papers Overview by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For 
more information, please contact digitalcommons@ric.edu. 
 
	  
	  
	  
FOREIGN	  POLICY	  DURING	  THE	  VIETNAM	  WAR:	  	  
THE	  ATTEMPTED	  MODERNIZATION	  OF	  	  
SOUTH	  VIETNAM	  
 
By 
Syeda Menebhi 
 
An Honors Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for Honors 
in 
The Department of History 
 
The School of Arts and Sciences 
Rhode Island College 
2014 
 
	  
	  
 
Menebhi	  2	  
	  
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Menebhi	  3	  
	  
Introduction 
 The United States became deeply involved in Vietnam during the 1960s largely 
due to America’s desire to assure that developing countries modernize as capitalist and 
democratic.  Thus, American involvement began with economic and social support in 
South Vietnam.  Yet slowly, throughout the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson, the goal of modernizing South Vietnamese society and containing communism 
became increasingly implemented by military means.  Further, it seems clear that, 
regardless of how much effort the United States geared towards Vietnam, American 
defeat was inevitable.  By Richard Nixon’s presidency, the initial modernization goals in 
Vietnam mattered only in so far as they could preserve American credibility.    
Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all failed to realize that while U.S. time was 
limited in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese had all the time they needed to fight for the 
independence of their country.  The South Vietnamese forces could not defend 
themselves and the United States had to withdraw eventually. 
President Eisenhower and Kennedy both aimed to demonstrate to the world that a 
western, capitalist path towards development was better than an eastern, communist path.  
From the late 1950s to mid-1960s, the U.S. poured economic support into South Vietnam 
and attempted to develop the South’s economy, education system, and infrastructure.  
Eisenhower sent many South Vietnamese to Michigan State to learn about capitalism, 
freedom, and democracy.  Kennedy implemented a Strategic Hamlet program in South 
Vietnam that was meant to improve the economy.    Yet, Johnson’s programs were 
increasingly accompanied by military support in Vietnam.  He used the U.S. military to 
train the South Vietnamese forces and assist them in the effort to contain communism.  
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Johnson believed that if he could contain communism in North Vietnam, then he could 
assure that South Vietnam modernized as a capitalist and democratic state, rather than a 
communist one.  Suddenly, modernization became a strictly militarily implemented 
policy in Vietnam. 
While Johnson also tried to improve South Vietnam’s economy through strategic 
hamlets at the beginning of his presidency, he dramatically escalated military 
involvement in 1965.  Soon enough, it was only through military means that the United 
States tried to modernize Vietnam to show the dominance of capitalism.  Conversely, by 
the time Nixon was elected in 1968, modernization only mattered to sustaining U.S. 
credibility in the world.  It seemed that keeping South Vietnam a capitalist, democratic 
state for the sake of proving that capitalism was superior to communism was no longer an 
issue.  Instead, South Vietnam’s modernization might have only mattered to show that 
American could finish what they started.  Nixon wanted to appease the American people 
by withdrawing troops from Vietnam and do this honorably by avoiding the abandonment 
of the South Vietnamese.  He created a policy called Vietnamization to achieve these 
goals.  This policy aimed to build up the South Vietnamese forces so that they could 
defend themselves against communist aggressors.   Nixon figured if the South could 
defend itself, he could withdraw troops without completely abandoning Thieu. Plus, there 
would still be a good chance that communism would stay contained in the North, 
allowing the South to develop capitalistically.  However, Nixon was naïve in his 
predictions because the South Vietnamese forces were weak and the North Vietnamese 
had time on their side.  
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Instead of achieving “peace with honor” in Vietnam as he hoped, Nixon settled on 
a “decent interval” strategy.  That is, he withdrew from Vietnam with the hopes that he 
strengthened the South’s army just enough so that they could defend themselves for a 
decent interval of time before communist forces took over the South.  This way, Nixon 
could claim that the fall of South Vietnam to communism was not due to a shortcoming 
of the United States but rather, the inability of the South Vietnamese to defend 
themselves. 
It seems that the economic and social modernization of South Vietnam that 
gravely concerned Eisenhower and Kennedy might have mattered to Nixon only for the 
purpose of preserving American credibility.  Paradoxically, the desire to modernize South 
Vietnam as a capitalist and democratic state to show the dominance of capitalism only 
plunged the United States military more deeply into Vietnam; yet, by the time America 
wanted out of the war, modernization mattered very little.  Further, the North Vietnamese 
had all the time in the world to fight for the independence of their country.  The United 
States would eventually have to withdraw and the South Vietnamese could never be 
strong enough to fight against the communist forces alone. 
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Chapter 1: The Beginning of Modernization Politics 
During the years after the end of World War II, a bipolar construct of world 
economies and ideologies began to emerge.  On one side were members of the 
communist Eastern Bloc, which included the Soviet Union and its allied countries in 
central and Eastern Europe.  On the other was the Western or capitalist bloc, consisting of 
countries that were allied with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.  In a period referred to as the Cold War, these opposing blocs tried to 
establish dominance over one another and influence the rest of the world.  The two blocs 
competed for the best technology and held different views about how developing 
countries should modernize their economies.  The United States sought to spread the 
American version of modernization, comprised of capitalism and democracy, to 
developing nations.  The Soviet Union and China, on the other hand, sought to modernize 
countries by spreading communism to the developing world, to move away from 
economic competition towards theoretical economic equality.1 
The developing world consisted mostly of counties that had gained independence 
from European imperialism during the mid-twentieth century.  Several theories of 
development emerged during this period.  The first was Modernization Theory, 
developed by economist Walt Whitman Rostow and sociologists Neil Smelser and James 
Coleman.2  Modernization theorists argued that every developing country followed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  George	  C.	  Herring,	  America’s	  Longest	  War:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Vietnam	  1950-­‐1975,	  4th	  ed.	  (New	  
York:	  McGraw	  Hill	  Companies,	  2002),	  17.	  
2	  Rostow	  concentrated	  on	  the	  economic	  modernization	  of	  developing	  countries.	  	  Smelser	  took	  a	  
sociological	  approach	  to	  modernization	  (see	  Neil	  Smelser,	  Toward	  a	  Theory	  of	  Modernization,	  Tribal	  and	  
Peasant	  Economies	  :	  Readings	  in	  Economic	  Anthropology,	  1967.)	  	  Coleman	  took	  a	  political	  approach	  to	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same linear path to full democratic, capitalist growth and potential.  This process could be 
sped up by exposure to already fully developed countries.  Rostow argued that the 
economic growth and modernization of developing countries happened in five different 
stages.  During the first stage, “The Traditional Society”, a country was limited in its 
economic growth and functioned within the realm of pre-Newtonian science and 
technology.  The second stage, “The Preconditions for Take-Off,” described countries 
that accepted new, western scientific developments and aimed towards economic 
progress.  The third stage of growth, “The Take-Off” indicated that a country had 
abandoned its old patterns of slower progress and instead, embraced rapid expansion and 
economic growth.  Rostow argued that a country was in the fourth stage, “The Drive to 
Maturity” when that country invested ten to twenty percent of its national income 
towards modern technology and programs that will expand the economy.  During this 
stage, new industries accelerated and the country developed international economic 
relations. Last, Rostow called the fifth stage of growth “The Age of High-Mass 
Consumption,” in which a country becomes completely modernized.  Once a country 
reaches this stage, it experiences two things: first, a large number of people gain access to 
consumption that translates to basic food, shelter, and clothing and second, “the structure 
of the working force changed in ways which increased not only the proportion of urban to 
total population, but also the proportion of the population working in offices or in skilled 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
modernization	  (see	  James	  Coleman,	  Education	  and	  Political	  Development,	  Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  1965.)	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factory jobs.”3  Rostow argued that every modernizing country followed this same linear 
path, and exposure to already developed countries would speed up the process.4   
Another economic development theory, dependency school theory, argued that 
countries did not develop in the same way but rather, each state contained its own unique 
traits and practices and thus developed in different ways.  The dependency school 
originated in Latin America in the early 1960s with the bankruptcy of the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) program.  Many populist regimes had previously 
hoped that the ECLA developmental strategy (which was, in fact, similar in some ways to 
the American modernization school) would lead to economic expansion.  However, 
throughout the 1960s, Latin America experienced grave unemployment and currency 
devaluation, which made many question the American modernization school theory of 
development.5   
The dependency school quickly spread to scholars in the United States.  
Sociologist Alvin So argues that the new theory “resonated with the sentiments of a new 
generation of young radical researchers who came of age during the campus revolts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  W.	  W.	  Rostow,	  The	  Stages	  of	  Economic	  Growth:	  A	  Non-­‐Communist	  Manifesto.	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1960),	  10.	  
4	  W.	  W.	  Rostow,	  The	  Stages	  of	  Economic	  Growth,	  1-­‐16.	  	  Rostow	  derived	  his	  theories	  from	  sociologists	  and	  
political	  scientists	  who	  introduced	  modernization	  theory	  as	  a	  historical	  process.	  	  Ferdinand	  Toennies	  
discussed	  the	  modernization	  of	  social	  systems	  and	  his	  views	  were	  later	  modified	  and	  expanded	  by	  Talcott	  
Parsons	  (see	  Talcott	  Parsons,	  Societies:	  Evolutionary	  and	  Comparative	  Perspectives,	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  
1966).	  	  Howard	  Becker	  offered	  a	  theory	  about	  the	  conversion	  in	  developing	  societies	  from	  tradition	  and	  
ritual	  to	  happiness	  and	  efficiency	  (see	  Howard	  Becker,	  Through	  Values	  to	  Social	  Interpretation,	  (Durham,	  
N.C.,	  1950).	  	  Other	  early	  advocates	  of	  modernization	  theory	  include	  S.N.	  Eisenstadt,	  Modernization:	  
Protest	  and	  Change,	  (Englewood	  Cliffs,	  1966)	  and	  Marion	  Levy,	  Modernization	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  
Politics:	  A	  Setting	  for	  International	  Affairs,	  (Princeton,	  1965).	  
5	  In	  the	  1970s,	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  dependency	  school	  emerged	  called	  the	  world-­‐system	  school.	  	  For	  the	  
purpose	  of	  my	  paper,	  however,	  I	  will	  only	  discuss	  the	  most	  relevant	  theories,	  modernization	  and	  
dependency.	  	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  world-­‐system	  school,	  see	  Alvin	  So,	  Social	  Change	  and	  
Development:	  Modernization,	  Dependency,	  and	  World-­‐System	  Theories,	  (Newbury	  Park,	  CA:	  Sage	  
Publications,	  1990).	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antiwar protests, women’s liberation activities, and ghetto rebellions of that time.”6  The 
dependency school criticized how modernization theorists assumed that there was 
something wrong inside third world countries, which is why they were underdeveloped 
and needed to follow the Western path towards economic growth.  However, unlike 
“modernized countries,” third world countries had experienced colonialism and thus 
might not take the same path as countries that did not experience imperialist rule.  
Dependency school theorists also argued that the relationship between two or more 
countries “assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can 
expand and can be self-starting, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this 
only as a reflection of that expansion.”7  This interpretation of international relationships 
could eventually be directly applied to the relationship between Vietnam and the United 
States. 
Even though dependency theory would eventually apply to U.S.-Vietnam 
relations, modernization school theory was more popular among politicians at the 
beginning of the war.  In fact, there is a discussion amongst scholars about how the 
philosophies of modernization school theory served as a primary reason for our initial 
involvement in Vietnam.  Alvin So attributes the rise of the modernization school in 
American politics to the global situation after World War II.  The United Stated emerged 
from the war as a world leader and aimed to reconstruct Europe with the Marshall Plan.  
So argues that it became a U.S. task to manage world affairs.  Many European colonies in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America gained independence and needed a model of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Alvin	  So,	  Social	  Change	  and	  Development,	  91-­‐92.	  
7	  Quoted	  in	  So,	  Social	  Change	  and	  Development,	  98.	  	  Quote	  comes	  from	  Theotonio	  Dos	  Santos,	  The	  
Structure	  of	  Dependence,	  1971,	  225-­‐236	  in	  K.T.	  Kan	  and	  Donald	  C.	  Hodges	  (eds.)	  Readings	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
Imperialism,	  Boston:	  Extending	  Horizons.	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development to promote their economy and political independence.  With the threat of 
the communist movement, So asserts that “American political elites encouraged their 
social scientists to study the Third World nation-states, to promote economic 
development and political stability in the Third World, so as to avoid losing the new 
states to the Soviet communist bloc.”8  These Third World nation-states included 
Vietnam, since Vietnam gained their independence from France in 1954. 
Historian Howard Jones also argues that the rising postwar nations and the rivalry 
between east and west led to a foreign policy that involved containment of communism 
and capitalist development around the world.  He claims that Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
“sought to achieve order in the world through economic and military measures.”9  
Historian Michael Latham makes similar assertions about how “modernization would 
prove an effective response to an aggressive and opportunistic adversary in a 
decolonizing world.”10  Latham goes in depth about how Kennedy made foreign policy 
decisions in Vietnam that were prompted by philosophies consistent with the American 
modernization school.11 Orrin Schwab does something similar, referring to modernization 
as “developmental policies” and “defending the free world.”  Like Latham, Schwab has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  So,	  Social	  Change	  and	  Development,	  17.	  
9	  Howard	  Jones,	  Crucible	  of	  Power:	  A	  History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  from	  1897,	  ed.	  2,	  (New	  York:	  
Rowman	  and	  Littlefield	  Publishers	  Inc.,	  2008),	  303-­‐305.	  
10	  Michael	  Latham,	  Modernization	  as	  Ideology:	  American	  Social	  Science	  and	  ‘Nation	  Building’	  in	  the	  
Kennedy	  Era,	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2000),	  23.	  
11	  Latham	  discusses	  the	  modernization	  school	  specifically	  pertaining	  to	  issues	  in	  Vietnam	  in	  Latham,	  
Modernization	  of	  Ideology,	  Chapter	  5:	  Modernization	  at	  War-­‐	  Counterinsurgency	  and	  the	  Strategic	  Hamlet	  
Program	  in	  Vietnam,	  beginning	  on	  page	  51.	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much to say about Kennedy’s decisions, but also applies the idea of foreign development 
as a means of policy decisions to Johnson’s administration up until the Gulf of Tonkin.12 
In the historical timeline, scholars tend to stop discussing modernization theory 
and development in relation to U.S. involvement in Vietnam once they get to the middle 
of Johnson’s presidency, when U.S. military involvement significantly increased.  Thus, 
the literature about this period makes a jump from economic and developmental reasons 
for involvement to military reasons.  This is most likely due to the fact that by this point, 
the Vietnam War had changed.  Proving that capitalism was a dominant ideology to 
communism mattered much less by the mid-1960s than it mattered in the post-WWII 
years and at the beginning of the Vietnam War.  While it seems that none of these 
historians take the time to explicitly point out this pattern, it is evident through their 
discussions of American involvement in the war. 
Yet this does demonstrate that during the mid-1950s when the United States 
became more involved in the issues surrounding Vietnam, the modernization school 
heavily influenced the Eisenhower administration policies.  In May 1954, the Vietnamese 
defeated the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu, thus ending the French’s imperialistic 
rule in Vietnam and the first Indochina War.  In the following months, the Soviet Union, 
United States, United Kingdom, and the People’s Republic of China joined in Geneva, 
Switzerland to discuss the unification of North and South Vietnam and the prospect for 
peace in Southeast Asia.  The resulting document, the Geneva Accords, stated that the 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) led by Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Orrin	  Schwab,	  Defending	  the	  Free	  World:	  John	  F.	  Kennedy,	  Lyndon	  Johnson,	  and	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  1961-­‐
1965,	  (Westport,	  Connecticut:	  Praegar	  Publishers,	  1998).	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recognized as a legitimate government and temporarily separated from the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of the North at the seventeenth parallel.  No military or 
economic assistance would be provided from an outside party such as the U.S. or China.  
The two zones would be politically unified in 1956 by free and democratic elections.  
However, as stated by Canadian diplomat John Holmes, the Geneva Accords were 
essentially a “nasty bargain accepted by all parties as the only way to avoid a dangerous 
confrontation.”13   Thus, since the agreements were unappealing to all involved, it was no 
surprise when the unification of Vietnam did not happen.  Rather, the 1956 elections only 
took place in the South, and the DRV led by communist Ho Chi Minh refused to 
recognize the Southern, democratic regime as legitimate.14 
Eisenhower’s administration recognized that the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 
and the communist insurgency in the South, the National Liberation Front were, together, 
a powerful force.  In fact, it was clear that they could defeat the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) and take over the RVN to create a unified, communist state of 
Vietnam.  Of course, in the bipolar context of the Cold War, Eisenhower’s administration 
felt threatened by the prospect of this happening.  The United States represented a “free” 
society comprised of capitalism and democracy.  Eisenhower placed urgency on 
protecting other free, democratic nations around the world from communist aggression.  
Thus, the United States administration sought to “protect” South Vietnam and prove 
democratic capitalism to be the more powerful ideology.  On April 7, 1954, when asked 
about the importance of Indochina to the free world, Eisenhower replied, “With respect to 
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more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 
million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can’t afford greater 
losses…the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.”15  
The U.S. became determined to achieve one predominant goal in Southeast Asia: to 
assure that Vietnam developed as a capitalist, democratic state. 
Several months later in September 1954, the United States formed the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) with France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.  SEATO held the primary goal of containing 
communism and repelling communist aggression.  Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos could 
not join SEATO because of the Geneva Accords which stated that they may not receive 
assistance from outside parties.  However, with the introduction of communist aggression 
from North Vietnam shortly after SEATO formed, these countries soon became territory 
under SEATO’s protection.  This gave Eisenhower and his administration legal rationale 
for continued involvement in Vietnam.16  It allowed The United States to help build 
South Vietnam’s economy and guide Diem towards western economic development. 
 From the mid-1950s to early 1960s, the nation building of South Vietnam became 
one of America’s top priorities.  The U.S. contributed more than one billion dollars 
towards building South Vietnam’s economy and military.  More than 1,500 Americans 
were placed on South Vietnamese soil to work with the government and train Vietnamese 
forces.  This nation building marked the beginning of developmental policies 
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implemented in Vietnam, which would soon include the improvement of South 
Vietnamese education and society in general.17 
To improve education in South Vietnam, Eisenhower worked with Michigan State 
University.  Public administration specialists from the college taught Vietnamese civil 
servants a wide range of useful skills.  Police officers from Vietnam trained at MSU’s 
school of law enforcement.18  Unfortunately, these efforts failed once the Vietnamese 
returned home.  The students, having become very well adapted to democracy in 
America, were placed back in Vietnam where South Vietnamese Diem’s so-called 
“democracy” demonstrated nothing more than a patron-client dictatorship. 
Still, by attempting to build up South Vietnam’s economy, military, government, 
and education, Eisenhower essentially worked towards one goal: the capitalist and 
democratic modernization of South Vietnam.  This nation building sought to improve the 
lives of the South Vietnamese by adopting an American, Western bloc model of life.  In 
less than a decade, though, the effort to modernize Vietnam’s society as a whole would 
turn into a widespread military effort to contain communism in the North; involving 
hundreds of thousands of Americans and causing chaos within the United States.  
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Chapter 2: Modernization in the Kennedy Era 
 Throughout Kennedy’s presidency, the modernization of Vietnam became 
increasingly enforced through policies that involved an expanded U.S. military effort.  
The U.S. wanted to contain communist aggression to ensure that South Vietnam 
modernized as a capitalist, democratic state.  But the South Vietnamese forces had 
trouble defending themselves against the communist North and National Liberation Front 
and Kennedy worried that, if the North successfully took over the South, the South would 
become communist and develop a non-competitive economic system.  To avoid this 
outcome and assist the South Vietnamese forces, Kennedy implemented modernization 
policies in South Vietnam that involved the escalation of U.S. ground troops in Southeast 
Asia.  This U.S. military effort began to replace his concentration on economic 
development in South Vietnam.  Unfortunately, these military policies proved 
exceedingly difficult to implement and failed to improve the situation in South Vietnam 
before Kennedy’s death in 1963.  However, his initial expansion of U.S. troop 
involvement had a large effect on continued American efforts in Vietnam and would 
subsequently encourage President Johnson to continue to use the military to prevent a 
communist victory. 
 Kennedy thought that the containment of communism was crucial and he was 
influenced by Rostow’s ideas about economic development as a way to achieve this goal.  
This was demonstrated through his application of counterinsurgency programs all over 
the globe at in the early 1960s.  At the time, Rostow was the deputy director of the 
National Security Council.  Kennedy’s CI system was meant to establish institutional and 
cultural connections between third world societies and the United States.  Kennedy’s 
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desire to expose developing countries to the United States went hand and hand with 
Rostow’s belief that exposure to an already modernized country could speed up the 
modernization process for developing countries.  By the end of Kennedy’s presidency, 
almost every developing country outside of the Soviet bloc had an American team inside 
the U.S. embassy to steer that country away from communism and towards capitalist 
development.  The members of the CI program underwent training so that they could 
assist the governments of developing countries and sustain the regimes that aligned 
themselves with the Western bloc during the Cold War.  This included political and 
economic support—but also military means to modernize any given country.19 
 It was clear that Kennedy feared the spread of communism, and he publicly 
warned Americans of communist leaders who sought to spread their oppressive regimes 
to developing countries all over the world.  He cautioned that America needed to defend 
free countries, or else men like Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban Prime 
Minister Fidel Castro would influence countries in Africa and Asia.  In a speech on 
September 15, 1960 in Paterson, New Jersey, Kennedy stated,  
The last few years have seen a steady increase in the power and prestige of 
the Communist world. I think it is time we reverse it.  We may be able next week 
to confine Mr. Khrushchev to the island of Manhattan, and Mr. Castro to the 
island of Manhattan, but we have not confined Mr. Khrushchev in Africa, and we 
have not confined Mr. Castro in Latin America. I think it is time that this country 
started to move again.20 
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 He argued that if the United States failed to defend free institutions, the entire 
world would begin to move towards the Communist bloc.21  If just one country in 
Southeast Asia such as Vietnam fell to communism, other surrounding countries would 
fall as well.  Scholar Michael Latham argues that this theory, called the Domino Theory, 
showed how communism posed a psychological threat to the United States.  By 1961, the 
world viewed the United States as the back bone of South Vietnam’s democracy.  If 
South Vietnam fell to communism and other countries followed, Kennedy and his 
administration believed that this would challenge the validity of United States freedom 
and democracy.22 
 To make matters worse, in June 1961, Khrushchev asserted the Soviet Union 
would commit itself to countries participating in wars of liberation for independence.  
Not only did Khrushchev’s remarks encourage the NLF’s uprising, but they also 
suggested that the Soviets would assist similar uprisings around the world.  This 
threatened Kennedy’s administration because it would be more difficult to defend “free 
nations” if newly independent countries looked to the Communist bloc for support.23  In 
fact, during the 1950s and 1960s, many countries that aimed to gain independence from 
British colonization looked to the Eastern bloc for weapons as well as economic support.  
Colonies under the imperialistic rule of Western bloc members had a shared enemy with 
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the Eastern bloc and this is one reason why many developing countries ultimately ended 
up communist rather than capitalist.24 
At the beginning of 1961, the military and political situation in South Vietnam 
was deteriorating rapidly.  In an assessment by the U.S. embassy in Saigon, the capital 
city of South Vietnam, the Country Team Staff Committee reported increasing activity of 
the NLF including guerilla warfare and propaganda.  The committee stated that the NLF 
hoped to gain all control of the countryside, including the Mekong Delta and other 
“liberated zones.”  The South Vietnamese forces at the Mekong Delta became 
particularly vulnerable to attack because of a flood that occurred throughout the next 
several months.  The overall morale, performance, and organization of the South 
Vietnamese Army under Ngo Dinh Diem suffered as well.  Diem ran a corrupt regime, 
committing nepotism in several cases and failing to show any serious commitment to the 
Vietnamese people in the countryside.  With the help of the NLF, the communist North 
appeared to be winning the war, which prompted the United States to take action.25 
By the summer of 1961, Kennedy and his administration’s commitment to 
containing communism put the struggle in Vietnam at the top of foreign policy agenda.  
As Michael Latham argues, “A small Southeast Asian country thousands of miles across 
the Pacific, Vietnam eventually acquired immense, unparalleled significance for the 
United States.  By the early 1960s, it became the point around which vast quantities of 
American energy, resources, and lives would revolve.”   President Kennedy sent Walt 
Whitman Rostow and Maxwell Taylor to Vietnam in order to assess the situation and 
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make suggestions about future U.S. commitment.  They reported back to Kennedy on the 
South’s deteriorating situation and in a telegram on October 25, Taylor suggested that the 
U.S. send 6,000 to 8,000 troops to South Vietnam.26 
To avoid any backlash for widening U.S. commitment in Vietnam, Taylor 
suggested that the Mekong Delta flood might be a plausible reason for the deployment of 
troops.  He argued that “it gives a specific humanitarian task as the prime reason for the 
coming of our troops and avoids any suggestion that we are taking over responsibility for 
the security of the country.”27   At the end of the same telegram, Taylor noted that 
combined with “other actions”, the additional troops would show that “a more effective 
working relationship in the common cause has been established between the GVN and 
the U.S.”28   Ultimately, Taylor aimed to use flood relief as a reason to militarily assist 
the South Vietnamese in the “common cause” of containing communism. 
Senator Mike Mansfield severely critiqued Taylor’s suggestions. Rather than 
playing along with the humanitarian jargon, Mansfield cut to the chase: “I would 
wholeheartedly favor, if necessary and feasible, a substantial increase of American 
military and economic aid to Viet Nam, but leave the responsibility of carrying the 
physical burden of meeting communist infiltration, subversion, and attack on the 
shoulders of the South Vietnamese, whose country it is and whose future is their chief 
responsibility.”	  29   While Mansfield demonstrated total opposition to military assistance 
in South Vietnam in order to contain communism, he quickly suggested other 
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modernization policies at a political and economic level.  In the same memorandum, 
Mansfield recommended that the U.S. commit to vast economic development which 
“bears a Vietnamese hallmark and our name in small print no matter how much we may 
contribute to it.”30  He also argued that the U.S. should rapidly introduce democratic 
practices at the village and provincial level.   
 In a memorandum on November 5, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
suggested a much more robust military commitment to South Vietnam.  He argued that 
the administration needed to use the U.S. Army to contain communism in Southeast Asia; 
and a ground force of 6-8,000 troops would not achieve that goal.  It would surely help 
Diem’s regime but that amount of men would “not convince the other side (whether the 
shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business.”31  Rather, 
McNamara argued that the 6-8,000 troops should be an initial force, followed by others 
over time.  He estimated that to assure the independence of the GVN (and thus, assure 
that GVN modernizes as a capitalist, democratic state), the amount of U.S. forces 
committed to South Vietnam “will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men” 
and that “our military posture is, or can be made, adequate to furnish these forces.”32    
McGeorge Bundy agreed with McNamara’s suggestions.  Bundy argued that a force of 6-
8,000 might not work out because 1. Diem might fail to improve his performance despite 
the help or 2. Moscow might rush to Hanoi’s side as a response to the addition of U.S. 
ground troops. Since this amount of men might not help Diem anyways, Bundy argued 
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that a more robust commitment to South Vietnam from the start would be a smarter 
decision.33 
The Taylor-Rostow Mission prompted the first proposals of U.S. military 
involvement as a means to contain communist aggression from North Vietnam.  In 
repelling communist aggression, the U.S. could ensure that South Vietnam remained a 
capitalist, democratic state in the modernization process.  On November 22, as a response 
to the pessimistic Taylor Report, McGeorge Bundy released National Security Action 
Memorandum No. 111, which laid out the “First Phase of Viet-Nam Program.”  He stated 
that the U.S. would immediately take certain actions in support of the Government of the 
Republic Vietnam (GVN).  These included an increase in air lifted supplies to the GVN 
forces, providing equipment necessary for air-ground support techniques and special 
intelligence, U.S. advisors and personnel, training and equipping the civil guard, and 
improving the military-political intelligence system.34    
As well as equipping the South Vietnamese forces, Kennedy remained committed 
to modernizing South Vietnam’s infrastructure and economy.  In February 1962, 
Kennedy implemented a Strategic Hamlet Program to consolidate the villagers into one 
easily defendable area, gain support from the South Vietnamese and assist in nation 
building.35   However, several problems arose from this modernizing approach.  First, the 
peasants who were removed from their homes and placed in strategic hamlets felt 
displaced.  Second, the program did not do anything to remove the corrupt patron-client 
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system in South Vietnam.   Thus, the hamlet program failed in gaining any support from 
the South Vietnamese.  Lastly, American arms placed in the hamlets were open to 
peasant access- many of whom supported the National Liberation Front.  Thus, Kennedy 
accidently armed the enemy.36 
Kennedy also implemented Project Beefup to support the counterinsurgency 
efforts aimed at undermining the NLF.  The administration introduced Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in South Vietnam and American military 
involvement more than doubled between 1961 and 1962.  Even when U.S. troops fought 
in combat, they were still deemed “advisers” to assure the public that America held a 
strictly advisory role in Vietnam.  The U.S. had over 9,000 “advisers” in Vietnam by the 
end of 1962.  The additional American assistance allowed ARVN to launch major 
military operations.  Project Beefup, coupled with the strategic hamlet program, had the 
primary goal of generating support for Diem’s capitalist democracy in the South.  
Unfortunately, these efforts failed for several reasons.  First, ARVN and MACV had 
trouble distinguishing between NLF members and innocent civilians.  Second, South 
Vietnamese and U.S. advisers had different ideas of how they wanted to operate, which 
led to weak leadership.  Third, regardless of training techniques and military operations, 
the insurgency still held a military advantage in South Vietnam.  “Beefing up” ARVN 
proved to be a difficult task and thus, the U.S. could not count on South Vietnamese 
forces to defend themselves against communist aggression at that point.	  37  Project Beefup 
served as a marker in Kennedy’s presidency of the transition from economic support and 
CI team programs to U.S. military support. 
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The year 1963 brought new problems regarding Vietnam.  Diem’s poor leadership 
and corruption continued to worsen the military situation in the South.  Historian Stanley 
Karnow argued that Diem ruled “like an ancient emperor, he could not deal effectively 
with either the mounting communist threat to his regime or the opposition of South 
Vietnam’s turbulent factions alienated by his autocracy.”38  Some of Diem’s generals 
were power hungry and others turned against him because of how he ruled like a dictator.  
By August, Diem’s senior officers and Kennedy’s administration began to talk about a 
possible coup d’état.  Kennedy seemed for the most part, ambivalent about supporting the 
coup.  However, the final decision regarding the overthrow of Diem was given to the 
ambassador of South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., who Kennedy understood was 
anti-communist and pro-Diem coup.  By November 1, Diem had been ousted by the 
military and General Duong Van Minh assumed the leadership of South Vietnam.39 
Shortly after, on November 22, Kennedy was shot in Dallas, Texas.  Many argue 
that Kennedy’s death dramatically changed the course of American involvement in 
Vietnam.  Historian David Kaiser claims that Kennedy lacked enthusiasm about the war 
in Southeast Asia and regarded it as a liability.  He argues that Kennedy neutralized 
Vietnam’s neighbor Laos, rejected several proposals for escalated American troops in 
Vietnam, and was ultimately ambivalent about the Diem coup.  According to Kaiser, this 
proves that Kennedy would not have escalated the Vietnam War to the extent that 
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President Johnson ultimately did.40  On the other hand, historian Frederik Logevall argues 
that Kennedy’s ambivalence about the Diem coup ended when he let Lodge take action 
on the matter.  Logevall adds that Kennedy’s ambivalence was only due to his worry that 
the coup would be unsuccessful.  Further, he argues that, although Kennedy put off 
difficult decisions about the Vietnam War, his actions ultimately led to an expanded U.S. 
presence in Vietnam that would have continued had Kennedy not been killed.41 
One thing is certain: Kennedy was deeply concerned about the containment of 
communism and the ability of third world countries to develop as capitalist democracies.  
This is evidenced by his modernization policies in Vietnam.  The failure of these policies 
should have indicated to Johnson the time and difficulty it would have taken to 
modernize a developing country.  Containing communism in North Vietnam proved to be 
a hard enough task up to Kennedy’s death—and the North Vietnamese forces and the 
NLF only continued to strengthen and gain popularity among the Vietnamese people.  
Yet, from the beginning of his presidency, Johnson was determined to achieve the same 
modernization goals that Kennedy aimed to achieve.  This determination would soon lead 
to a dramatically escalated war in Vietnam, and consequently, a war in America as well. 
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Chapter 3- Johnson and Modernization 
The issue of building South Vietnam into a capitalist and democratic state 
persisted into the mid-1960s.  However, many began to question whether or not this stood 
as a viable reason for escalated U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.  Johnson’s top 
advisers, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk agreed that U.S. military 
escalation was necessary in order to achieve their primary goal of containment in 
Vietnam.  As long as they contained communism in the North, South Vietnam could 
continue to modernize as a capitalist state.  Other advisers such as Under Secretary of 
State, George Ball and Oregon senator Wayne Morse argued against military escalation.  
They claimed that the United States could not fight a war for the South Vietnamese.  
They also showed concern about how much time it would take for the U.S. to contain 
communism militarily or force the communists to negotiate.42  In 1965, Johnson decided 
to significantly increase U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, which further pulled 
American efforts away from economic development in South Vietnam and towards a 
robust military presence there.43  The escalation of American troop presence caused 
widespread dissent to the war in the United States, which in turn set the stage for the 
chaotic conflict that President Richard Nixon would soon inherit. 
In the fall of 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident initiated serious discussion about 
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.  On August 2, communist forces attacked 
American ships with Soviet torpedo boats.  The U.S. quickly retaliated and left the 
confrontation practically unharmed; the North Vietnamese only hit the U.S. with one 
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round of a deck machine gun.  Two days later, the USS Maddox and destroyer C. Turner 
Joy were in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam when they reported that 
they were under attack.  Nobody actually witnessed an attack; the reports were based on 
sonar and radar devices, which could have been easily disrupted by the alleged 
treacherous sea weather.  In fact, it is unlikely that an actual attack on the U.S. ships took 
place on August 4.  In summarizing the incident, the Department of the Navy has recently 
claimed that, “More recent analysis of that data and additional information gathered on 
the 4 August episode now makes it clear that North Vietnamese naval forces did not 
attack Maddox and Turner Joy that night in the summer of 1964.”44  However, in 1964, 
the mere possibility that the North Vietnamese launched a second attack against the 
United States prompted Johnson and his administration to discuss greater military 
involvement in Vietnam.  Unbeknownst to Johnson at the time, the incident also caused 
the North Vietnamese to take action.  Anticipating that the United States would send a 
ground force to assist the South Vietnamese forces, Hanoi went to the Soviet Union and 
China for assistance.  Both agreed to aid the DRV in the struggle and China responded 
promptly by mobilizing forces along the North Vietnamese border.45 
By the summer of 1965, Johnson’s administration had entered a heavy debate 
about whether or not to expand U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.  What is most 
interesting about the debate is actually what was left out completely: by mid-1965, there 
was a complete absence of anyone in Johnson’s administration suggesting that the U.S. 
contribute to South Vietnam merely at an economic level.  While financial assistance and 
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development took a predominant role in Kennedy’s handling of Vietnam, the debate in 
Johnson’s administration was about how much military involvement should be increased.  
It is evident that the modernization of Vietnam had turned into a military policy to assure 
that South Vietnam wasn’t taken over by the communists.46 
It was clear at this point that the communists controlled the battlefield and the 
Republic of Vietnam failed to find political stability.  In the previous five years, the RVN 
had undergone five regime changes.  Further, the current President, Nguyen Van Thieu 
and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky did not look promising to the U.S. administration.  
To many of Johnson’s advisers, the instability of South Vietnam’s political state served 
as an even greater reason to become involved in the war against communist aggression.  
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara all suggested that broad U.S. military efforts 
were necessary to defend the free world from communism.  In other words, the only way 
they could assure a Western modernization of Vietnam was with U.S. military assistance 
to train and equip South Vietnamese forces.  Otherwise, they argued, Vietnam and much 
of Southeast Asia would be taken over by communism.	  47 
In a memorandum to President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy argued that American 
military assistance in Vietnam would make the difference between a capitalist, 
democratic Vietnam and a communist takeover.  He claimed that “the most significant 
element of stability and strength, insofar as the struggle against Communist insurgency is 
concerned, remains the external factor of U.S. military, economic and political support. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Debate	  outlined	  in	  Herring,	  America’s	  Longest	  War,	  148-­‐151	  and	  in	  Stanley	  Karnow,	  Vietnam:	  A	  History,	  
(New	  York:	  The	  Viking	  Press,	  1983),	  420-­‐426.	  
47	  George	  Herring,	  America’s	  Longest	  War,	  162.	  
Menebhi	  28	  
	  
Without it, the country would quickly succumb to Communist domination.”48   Dean 
Rusk argued that the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was a representation of the U.S. 
commitment to the free world in general.  He wrote,  
The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal pillar of peace 
throughout the world. If that commitment becomes unreliable, the communist 
world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to 
a catastrophic war… There are obvious risks in any engagement between free and 
communist countries, especially where large communist countries are contiguous 
to the area of conflict. But these risks are present for the communists as well. If 
they discover that we are less resolved than they, the prospect for the future is 
exceedingly dark.49 
Thus, Rusk was primarily concerned about the ideological ramifications of the Vietnam 
War.  In other words, if the U.S. would fail to prevent a communist takeover of Vietnam, 
then communists around the world might suspect that the U.S. failed to sustain a free 
democracy anywhere in the world.  Rusk’s worries about the expansion of communism 
showed that he had grave concerns about modernizing South Vietnam as a capitalist, 
democratic state.  He stated in the same paper that “so long as the South Vietnamese are 
prepared to fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster…to our 
interests throughout the world.”50   His mention of the risk that the war posed to 
American “interests throughout the world” suggests that he cared primarily about U.S. 
credibility.  He argued that an abandonment of the Vietnamese would be disastrous to the 
American image if the Vietnamese still had the will to fight.  In other words, the United 
States had to remain consistent in protecting “free” societies not only for each society’s 
sake, but to sustain a certain image on the world stage.  So although Rusk’s anti-
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communist rhetoric demonstrated his concerns about Vietnam developing as a non-
communist state, it seems he had other worries as well.  
McNamara also suggested expanded U.S. involvement in Vietnam in a 
memorandum to Johnson on July 20.  He stated that the U.S. and South Vietnamese 
forces needed to create conditions for a favorable outcome in Vietnam.  This involved 
demonstrating to the DRV and NLF that the odds were against them on the battlefield.  
This, he argued, would give the U.S. an upper hand at the negotiating table.  He argued 
that “the course of action recommended in this memorandum—if the military and 
political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible 
determination—stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a 
reasonable time in Vietnam.”51   What McNamara failed to realize was that his 
predominant objective- containing communism and thus, modernizing South Vietnam as 
a democratic, “free” nation- would have taken much more time than he projected.  
McNamara never specified in this memorandum what he considered to be a “reasonable” 
amount of time.  However, it is safe to assume he was not suggesting that the U.S. 
commit a military presence in Vietnam until 1973.  In Social Change and Development, 
Alvin So stated several assumptions made by researchers of the modernization school.  
One of these assumptions was that modernization was a lengthy process.  So argued that 
“it is an evolutionary change, not a revolutionary change.  It will take generations, or 
even centuries to complete, and its profound impact will be felt only through time.”52    
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Under Secretary of State George Ball and Senator Wayne Morse argued against 
expanded U.S. efforts in Vietnam, partially because of the amount of time it would take 
to modernize South Vietnam.  Ball argued that the U.S. could not create McNamara’s 
“favorable conditions” regardless of how many American soldiers went to Vietnam.  He 
also argued quite bluntly that the U.S. could not win another nation’s war: “No one has 
demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which 
is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a 
population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus provides a 
great intelligence advantage to the other side.”53  Morse also argued that Vietnam was a 
losing war.  He refuted McNamara’s suggestions for expanded U.S. involvement by 
claiming that, “it would be a very serious mistake to think the American people would 
support a stalemated ground war in Vietnam for a period long enough to force the 
Communists into negotiating.”54   Morse seemed to understand that forcing the 
communists to negotiate on U.S. terms by gaining an upper hand on the battlefield would 
take an extended amount of time (if possible at all).  He understood the stubbornness of 
the North Vietnamese and Chinese and recognized the growing dissent to the Vietnam 
War in the United States.  Since U.S. time seemed to be limited in Vietnam, Morse 
suggested that Johnson give the responsibility of finding peace in Vietnam to the United 
Nations.55 
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But President Johnson made it clear that America had an obligation to fulfill U.S. 
responsibilities in Vietnam and assure that South Vietnam remains independent.  He 
stated,  
There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there… we 
found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.  Our 
objective is the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom…We want 
nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide 
their own country in their own way.56 
The “freedom” of Vietnam referred to the ability of South Vietnam to be an independent, 
democratic nation.  Although Johnson did not literally use the words “democracy” or 
“capitalist society”, the term “free” stood for everything that the U.S. aimed to 
accomplish in Vietnam.  Johnson made it very clear in this speech that he wanted South 
Vietnam to modernize as a non-communist (and therefore, capitalist and democratic) 
state.  In fact, this goal was so important to Johnson that he allowed it to interfere with his 
Great Society plans for the United States.  Johnson had intended to create programs that 
would lead America towards economic and racial equality.  Funding the Vietnam War 
prevented him from making any substantial progress toward these domestic goals.  
Indeed, Johnson stressed the importance of containing communism in Vietnam compared 
to improving American society: “Losing the Great Society was a terrible thought, but not 
so terrible as the thought of being responsible for America’s losing a war to the 
Communists.  Nothing would be worse than that.”57  
Before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Johnson seemed fully committed to 
improving South Vietnamese society using U.S. professionals.  The U.S. had a team of 
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doctors, teachers, accountants and mechanics teaching the South Vietnamese in American 
schools.  Johnson set up a strategic hamlet program similar to Kennedy’s program to help 
build villages and strengthen South Vietnam’s economy.58  However, after the occurrence 
in the Gulf of Tonkin, U.S. assistance in South Vietnam became primarily a military 
effort.  Both Stanley Karnow and historian Fredrik Logevall argue that Johnson and his 
administration hoped for a communist attack and used the U.S. ships as bait in the gulf.  
This way, Johnson would have an excuse to become militarily involved in Vietnam59  
Even though there was no confirmed attack, the Tonkin Gulf resolution gave Johnson 
permission to take whatever means necessary to protect the U.S. and South Vietnam from 
communist aggression.  Thus, escalated U.S. military presence in Vietnam began.  
This is not to say that Johnson only suggested plans for military involvement in 
Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.  The occurrence surely prompted serious 
conversations about a more robust U.S. military commitment but it did not altogether 
eliminate other aid that Johnson hoped to provide in the modernization of South Vietnam.  
For example, in a speech given at John Hopkins University in April 1965, Johnson asked 
congress to invest one billion dollars towards the peace effort in Vietnam.  He listed 
specific goals that this money could help accomplish in South Vietnam: 
The wonders of modern medicine can be spread through villages where 
thousands die every year from lack of care.  Schools can be established to train 
people in the skills that are needed to manage the process of development…	  I also 
intend to expand and speed up a program to make available our farm surpluses to 
assist in feeding and clothing the needy in Asia. We should not allow people to go 
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hungry and wear rags while our own warehouses overflow with an abundance of 
wheat and corn, rice and cotton.60 
Johnson seemed sincere about funding these efforts that would help modernize South 
Vietnam’s economy and improve the living situation of the Vietnamese.  He argued that 
the Mekong River could provide more food, water, power, and resources to the South 
Vietnamese than the Tennessee Valley Authority provided to Southern Americans.  His 
speech created a positive vision of American-Vietnamese relations as he discussed his 
dream of a war-free and poverty-free world.  He emphatically preached to America and 
the world for “reason to guide passion, and love to master hate.” 61  Yet, his decisions that 
shortly followed this melodramatic speech failed to mirror the images that he so firmly 
“dreamed” about.  
In fact, the speech at John Hopkins would be one of the last efforts to assist South 
Vietnam without using the U.S. military forces against communist forces.  It appears that 
Johnson’s good intentions were drowned out by the debate about an increase of U.S. 
troops in Vietnam.  About three months after his speech, despite the fact that some of his 
top advisers were against a robust military commitment, Johnson decided to dramatically 
increase U.S. military presence in Vietnam.  He increased the number of B-52s and 
heightened the bombing activity in North Vietnam.  He also deployed 50,000 troops to 
Vietnam and agreed to send another 50,000 by the end of the year if they were needed. 
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Johnson’s implicit agreement to send more forces whenever necessary cleared the way 
for the U.S. to assume most of the fighting in South Vietnam.62 
Naturally, this type of robust military involvement came with costs.  The 
cumulating monetary costs and increasing number of U.S. troops on Vietnamese soil 
caused growing American resistance to the war over the next few years.  This resistance 
took the form of street dissent and middle class dissent.  This is significant because the 
administration could much more easily deal with hippies burning draft cards than 
wealthy, influential figures leading organizations supported by the middle class.  The 
middle-class dissent presented the neo-colonial critique earlier put forth by Paul Robeson 
and W.E.B. Dubois.  Robseson and Dubois pointed out the hypocrisy of a “free” 
democratic, capitalist society that denies basic civil rights to people according to their 
race.  He argued that African Americans were subjected to similar inequities and 
dehumanizing that colonized peoples were exposed to under imperialism.  With these 
similarities in mind, Robeson argued that it would be wrong for African Americans to 
fight in Vietnam against victims of imperialism.63  Middle-class anti-war advocates such 
as Martin Luther King and Robert Moses preached these exact points during the late 
1960s. 
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Robert Moses served as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Council (SNCC) 
field secretary for voter registration based in McComb, Mississippi.  In the “McComb 
Mississippi Protest” of 1965, Moses and SNCC stated five reasons why African 
Americans should not fight in the Vietnam War.  The first reason mentions the 
inconsistency of freedoms in the U.S.: “No Mississippi Negroes should be fighting in 
Vietnam for the White Man’s freedom until all Negro people are free in Mississippi.”  
Moses and SNCC also group African Americans into a group with other oppressed 
people around the world, “We will be looked upon as traitors by the Colored people of 
the world if the Negro people continue to fight and die without a cause.” 64   These 
statements mirrored the neo-colonial critique put forth by Paul Robeson.   
One of the largest middle-class, anti-war demonstrations took place on April 4, 
1967 when more than 100,000 dissenters marched for four hours at the NYC Spring 
Mobilization Antiwar Rally.  The marchers stopped at Riverside Church to watch MLK 
declare his opposition to the war; a speech considered to be one of the most moving and 
influential of his lifetime.65    He argued that the Vietnam War destroyed the intrinsic 
values of the United States and claimed, “If America’s soul becomes totally poisoned, 
part of the autopsy must read ‘Vietnam.’”66  In other words, the war exposed the 
inequalities and deprivation of human rights that African Americans experienced in a 
supposedly free society.  Blacks fought for the freedom of the people of Vietnam and yet, 
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did not receive freedom in the U.S.  Rather, at home, they were subject to the same 
treatment of the colonized Vietnamese or the people of imperialist countries in Africa.  
MLK heavily influenced the middle-class and Moses had a broad influence on students 
and thus, their dissent proved to be threatening to the Johnson administration.   
In fact, American approval of the war dropped drastically in 1968 alone when on 
January 30, the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong launched a large scale offensive 
on the South during the Tet Holiday.  A Gallup Poll in February indicated that 50 percent 
of poll participants disapproved of President Johnson’s handling of the war, while only 
35 percent approved of the war effort. 67   Although the attack took the United States and 
South Vietnamese forces by surprise, they reacted quickly and regained most of the 
territory in less than a week. 68   Historians like James Willbanks and George Herring 
argue that the offensive resulted in a tactical victory for the United States and South 
Vietnam.  The North did not gain any territory and suffered approximately 40,000 deaths 
in battle, while the combined U.S. and South Vietnamese forces lost about 3,400. 69   
However, it proved to be a strategic long term victory for the North Vietnamese.  The 
NLF and DRV penetrated the urban centers of South Vietnam such as Hue and Khe Sanh.  
American televised accounts of the fighting in these cities displayed gory scenes of death 
and despair for the U.S. troops and made it appear that the North’s attack was successful.  
This made Americans believe that the situation in Vietnam was rapidly deteriorating, as 
newscaster Walter Cronkite infamously claimed, “What the hell is going on?  I thought 
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we were winning the war!” 70   Cronkite’s views heavily influenced American society and 
soon after Cronkite’s pessimistic statements on Vietnam, Johnson reportedly exclaimed, 
“If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.” 71 
This resistance made it increasingly difficult for Johnson to implement any 
military policy without domestic backlash.  He dismissed his critiques with arbitrary 
accusations, even once claiming that young dissenters would not “know a communist if 
they tripped over one.”72  Clearly, anti-communist Johnson had developed a military 
policy to contain communism in Vietnam and keep South Vietnam capitalist and 
democratic.  However, he was exhausted from public dissent and the Vietnam War in 
general.  On March 31, 1968, he announced to the United States that he would not run for 
a second presidential term.  By October of that year, Johnson called for a bombing halt, 
attempted serious negotiations with the Vietnamese and aimed to de-americanize the war.  
Unfortunately, these efforts did not succeed and thus, the agonizing end to Johnson’s 
presidency set the stage for the upcoming president elect.  Richard Nixon would walk 
into a battle similar to the one that Johnson dealt with for most of his presidency—the 
three-pronged struggle between a need to modernize Vietnam as a capitalist and non-
communist state, the necessity to negotiate with the DRV on U.S. terms, and the urgency 
to appease and satisfy the American people. 
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Chapter 4: Nixon Takes the Reins 
As the newly elected president in January, 1969, Richard Nixon had two primary 
goals regarding the Vietnam War: to appease the American people, and to achieve an 
honorable exit from South Vietnam.  Unlike his predecessors, he did not seem too 
concerned about modernizing the South for the sake of demonstrating that capitalism is 
better than communism.  Indeed, it appeared that Nixon may have only cared about the 
modernization of South Vietnam insofar as it helped him preserve American credibility.  
What he cared about most was the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam in order to satisfy 
Americans who had grown tired of the war.  Completing this task “honorably,” according 
to Nixon, involved avoiding any abandonment of the South Vietnamese or their 
president, Nguyen Van Thieu.   
Yet even for Nixon the goals of modernizing South Vietnam, supporting Thieu, 
and preserving American credibility remained directly connected.  If Nixon did not help 
the South contain communism in the North, the South would fall to communism and fail 
to modernize as a capitalist and democratic state.  Naturally, this would be seen as a 
complete abandonment of Nguyen Van Thieu and the South Vietnamese.  There is 
evidence to suggest that Nixon thought this abandonment would make America look 
cowardly to the rest of the world.  This very well could have been the reason why Nixon 
did not simply withdraw troops and end American involvement in the war from the start 
of his presidency.  There was a point in which the modernization of South Vietnam still 
mattered—because Nixon needed to show the world that America would not just abandon 
their allies but rather, stay committed to protecting “free” societies around the world. 
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Nixon’s “honorable exit” would be a difficult task to achieve because the strength 
of the Republic of Vietnam’s Armed Forces (RVNAF) did not compare to the strength of 
the NLF and North Vietnamese Army (NVA).  It was clear that the South’s forces 
depended completely on U.S. troops to defend South Vietnam from the communist 
enemies.  Nixon had walked into a dilemma: he wanted to avoid abandoning Thieu and 
the South Vietnamese, and yet he needed to bring the troops home because of America’s 
chaotic and divided state.  Thus, he created a policy called Vietnamization that he thought 
might solve this dilemma.  This policy involved the strengthening of the RVNAF so that 
ultimately, the South Vietnamese would be able to defend themselves without the 
assistance of the United States.  This way, U.S. troops could withdraw from Vietnam 
assured that there would not be a communist takeover of the South.  However, given the 
overall inconsistent strength of the RVNAF and the amount of time it would take to train 
them, Vietnamization was bound to fail.  In fact, there was much disagreement within the 
administration about the implementation of this policy for this very reason.73 
In retrospect, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger reflected upon 
the dilemma he and Nixon were faced with in 1969: “Whatever our original war aims, by 
1969 our credibility abroad, the reliability of our commitments, and our domestic 
cohesion were alike jeopardized by a struggle in a country as far away from the North 
American continent as our globe permits.”74  Kissinger understood that Nixon was caught 
between domestic dissent, preserving U.S. credibility, and the dependency of South 
Vietnam on U.S. troops.  Yet, the U.S. could not simply withdraw or walk away “from an 
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enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand 
dead as if we were switching a television channel… No serious policymaker could allow 
himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of ‘prestige’ or ‘honor’ or 
‘credibility.’”75   
One could reasonably argue that the ultimate modernization of South Vietnam did 
still matter to Nixon for the purpose of preserving American credibility.  Simply 
“walking away” from Vietnam might have appeased the American war dissenters, but it 
would be an abandonment of the South Vietnamese and would practically guarantee a 
communist victory in Vietnam.  This would hinder American honor and credibility.  
Further, it seemed that Nguyen Van Thieu wanted South Vietnam to remain capitalist.  A 
memorandum of a meeting on June 8 between Nixon, Kissinger, Thieu, and Thieu’s 
assistant Nguyen Phu Doc states, “President Thieu felt that the intentions of the enemy 
are crucial; the issue is the spread of communism.”76  Although Nixon did not fear 
communism spreading and becoming dominant over capitalism, Thieu might have held 
onto these concerns.  After all, it was Thieu’s power and regime that was directly 
threatened by the communists.  Thieu stated that he would not “accept a peace at all 
costs, especially a peace that would pave the way to the subjugation of 17 million South 
Vietnamese people by the Communists.”77   
Now, it is possible that Thieu did not care about the ideological struggle between 
communism and capitalism any more than Nixon cared.  So, the “subjugation of 17 
million South Vietnamese” to communism might not have even been a legitimate concern 
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for Thieu.  Rather, Thieu could have been merely concerned about staying in power, 
which by itself, served as a selfish reason to want to contain communism.  Thus, even if 
the threat to his power was Thieu’s only fear, he would overtly state worries about the 
future of the Vietnamese people to mask these selfish concerns.  Regardless of what 
Thieu’s actual motives were, if Nixon failed to contain communism in the North, he 
would be failing Thieu and the South Vietnamese.  Instead, Nixon needed to achieve this 
goal to allow for an autonomous South, if only to show that the United States was 
capable of finishing what it started in Vietnam: creating and sustaining a capitalist and 
democratic state.  Thus, one could argue that Nixon sought to contain communism in 
North Vietnam to preserve American credibility, and that this goal superseded the more 
serious hopes of Nixon’s predecessors of completely modernizing Vietnam into a 
capitalist, democratic state. 
In fact, Nixon even seemed to imply that he was concerned about modernization 
only for the sake of American credibility.  When a reporter asked Nixon about the 
reaction to a communist takeover of Vietnam, Nixon replied, “We would destroy 
ourselves if we pulled out in a way that wasn’t really honorable.”78  Thus, the concern 
was not the future of the Vietnamese people but rather, the possibility of America 
“destroying itself” or destroying its credibility if the U.S. did not exit Vietnam 
completely assured that the communists would not take over.  Stanley Karnow argues 
that both Nixon and Kissinger believed that the war had to be ended “honorably” for the 
sake of America’s global prestige.79  These men did not seem to care much about the 
political and/or economic modernization of South Vietnam in general.  However, they 
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agreed that the U.S. could not withdraw if communists would immediately take over the 
South.  This would not be “honorable” and would make America look bad to the rest of 
the world. 
A New York Times article written on September 14, 1969 argued something 
similar—that Nixon’s goal of creating a stable democracy in South Vietnam was merely 
to preserve American credibility: 
His basic objective appears to remain the same.  He and his aides insist 
they still want an “honorable” settlement—arrangements negotiated in Paris that 
would presumably guarantee temporary stability and autonomy for South 
Vietnam and, while far less ambitious than the military victory earlier envisaged 
by his predecessors, would leave intact what is still referred to in Washington as 
the “credibility” of America’s overseas commitments.80 
Although there does not exist a large amount of evidence to support this point, it 
does not seem rational that Nixon would have put forth so much military effort to build 
up the RVNAF before withdrawing American troops without good reason.  If he was 
only concerned about appeasing Americans and withdrawing from Vietnam, he could 
have easily done this—but he wanted an “honorable” exit from Vietnam.  Whether or not 
Nixon actually believed he could attain this goal is surely questionable. However, it 
seems only rational that, in implementing Vietnamization, Nixon aimed to show the 
world that America wouldn’t simply give up their international goals and abandon South 
Vietnam.   
Of course, it is possible that a rational explanation for Nixon’s efforts in the war did 
not exist, since both Nixon and Kissinger were incredibly naïve in the way they handled 
the war from the start.  Even with the knowledge that some of their colleagues highly 
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doubted Vietnamization, they expressed great confidence that they could end the war in a 
mere six months.  Kissinger even stated to a group of antiwar protestors, “Give us six 
months, and if we haven’t ended the war by then, you can come back and tear down the 
white house fence.”81  To begin, Nixon and Kissinger offered to negotiate with both the 
North Vietnamese and the Soviet Union, while also issuing a questionnaire to obtain a 
broad assessment of the military situation in Vietnam.  On January 2, 1969, Nixon wrote 
a message to the Vietnamese explaining his willingness to negotiate and find peace in 
Vietnam, as long as the U.S. exit could be honorable.  Hanoi’s response on January 30 
was not what Nixon wanted to hear: 
If the US really desires to settle the Vietnamese problem it must end the war 
of aggression in Vietnam, withdraw in the shortest possible period all American and 
satellite troops from South Vietnam and leave the South Vietnamese population to 
settle itself its own affairs without foreign interference. The US must as soon as 
possible start without delay the Conference of Four to discuss these profound 
questions.82 
Of course, Nixon had already decided that he would not settle for these terms.  He 
wanted a bilateral withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops so that South 
Vietnam would not be left with the NVA in their territory.  Again, an immediate, 
unilateral U.S. withdrawal essentially meant the abandonment of Nguyen Van Thieu and 
the South Vietnamese, which would not create the honorable exit from Vietnam that 
Nixon had hoped for.   
Perhaps Nixon’s next actions were fueled by the fact that Hanoi’s demands did 
not allow an honorable U.S. exit from Vietnam.  Or, perhaps, Nixon simply felt angry 
because he did not get what he wanted.  Regardless, instead of continuing to politely 
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negotiate, Nixon launched a bombing campaign against the North Vietnamese sanctuaries 
in neutral Cambodia.  This action was meant to prevent the North from mounting a 
military offensive against the South, but also to show Moscow and Hanoi that he meant 
business.83   This attack was supposed to be kept secret from the American public but 
shortly after it was implemented, the New York Times published a story about the 
bombings.  Since Nixon was concerned about appeasing the American people, he wire-
tapped seventeen government employees to prevent further leaks and launched a public 
relations campaign to gain popularity for his actions.  Overall, the Cambodian bombings 
did not prompt any cooperation from the North Vietnamese and once Americans sensed 
that the Paris negotiations were making no progress, Nixon’s approval ratings dropped.84 
The early negotiations with the North Vietnamese failed, so Nixon and Kissinger 
hoped that they could appeal to the Soviet Union and convince Soviet ambassador 
Anatoly Dobrynin to pressure the North Vietnamese into ending the war.  They would do 
this by using a “linkage” strategy; they would tell the Soviet Union that they were open to 
negotiate about other issues, such as strategic arms, as long as there was first, peace in 
Vietnam.85  By this point, Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating so Nixon and 
Kissinger also played the “China card” against the Soviet Union.  That is, they warned 
Dobrynin that the U.S. would ally itself with China if the USSR did not want to help the 
U.S. find an honorable exit from Vietnam.  Secret talks amongst Nixon, Kissinger, and 
Dobrynin began in February.86 
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These talks proved to be short-lived.  By mid-April, Nixon and Kissinger ruined 
their chances of getting the Soviet Union to help end the war.  On April 14, Kissinger met 
with Dobrynin to show him that Nixon was serious about ending the war.  Kissinger 
threatened that if no agreement could be made on Vietnam, then the U.S. “would take 
measures that might create a complicated situation.”87  Upon departing, Dobrynin told 
Kissinger, “This has been a very important conversation.”88  Yet, no response to the 
meeting was ever received from Moscow or Dobrynin.89  Perhaps, Dobrynin grew sick of 
Nixon and Kissinger’s threats and did not take the two men seriously.  Whatever the case, 
Nixon and Kissinger failed to get the Soviet Union to cooperate in ending the Vietnam 
War at the beginning of 1969. 
Simultaneous to the talks with Dobrynin, Nixon was making other efforts to 
achieve “peace with honor” in Vietnam.  A day after his inauguration, he issued National 
Security Memorandum 1 (NSSM 1) titled, “Situation in Vietnam” to assess the military 
situation in South Vietnam.  He asked twenty-eight questions about negotiations, the 
NVA and Viet Cong, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), Pacification, 
politics in South Vietnam, and U.S. Operations.  Most respondents of NSSM 1 wrote a 
pessimistic report about the current military situation in Vietnam and held that the RVN 
could not defend itself against the NLF and NVA without United States assistance.  
However, assessments about the improvement of RVNAF performance differed.  Most 
advisors in Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker in Saigon, and commander in chief at the U.S. Pacific forces John S. McCain Jr. 
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all reported that the North Vietnamese had a current military disadvantage.  Most of the 
senior advisors in ARVN agreed that the South Vietnamese had made great progress.  In 
contrast, Lt. General Walter T. Kerwin Jr. from III Corps Tactical zone stated that he 
observed no improvement in South Vietnamese forces and doubted that they could ever 
prevail without U.S. assistance.  The CIA, Defense Department, and State Department all 
offered similarly pessimistic conclusions. 90 
Rather than helping Nixon determine the situation in Vietnam, the mixed 
responses to NSSM 1 only confused matters.  It seemed clear that South Vietnamese 
forces could not withstand the enemy on their own.  Thus, a total United States 
withdrawal without a reciprocal North Vietnamese withdrawal remained out of the 
question.  However, the number of optimistic reports about South Vietnam’s progress 
gave Nixon hope that properly training the RVNAF could yield promising results.  He 
introduced a policy called Vietnamization in order to train the South’s forces.  The policy 
involved the strengthening of the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves 
against the NLF and NVA.  Nixon planned to increase the size of RVNAF, equip them 
with modern weapons and materiel, and improve the fighting abilities of the South 
Vietnamese.  Meanwhile, regular U.S. troop withdrawals would take place.  If 
Vietnamization succeeded, South Vietnamese forces could defend themselves and avoid 
a communist takeover.  This way, Nixon could avoid abandoning Thieu and the South 
Vietnamese.91 
Many of Nixon’s closest advisors supported the Vietnamization policy.  For 
example, the head of MACV, General Creighton Abrams, and Secretary of Defense 
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Melvin Laird supported the policy from the beginning.  At times, Vietnamization proved 
to be an incredibly difficult task for Abrams.  The different tactical zones in South 
Vietnam showed inconsistency in strength and leadership.  Pacification of the countryside 
and South Vietnamese troop morale proved to be an ingoing issue through 1969 and 
1970. However, Abrams fully supported the Vietnamization policy itself.92  Laird also 
supported the policy but understood in the early months of 1969 that U.S. time was 
limited in Vietnam.  He argued that U.S. dissenters are “giving the new administration a 
little time here” and that “we’ve got to make the best use of that time as we possibly can.  
It’s important that we have this time, because everything could have been lost without 
time.” 93  Of course, the prospect of “losing everything”—losing South Vietnam to 
communism, failing to prevent this and as a consequence, losing American world 
credibility and losing more American lives—was extremely troubling to Laird.  He would 
not watch years of U.S. military commitment result in a negative outcome in Vietnam.  
However, it appears Laird understood that building up the RVNAF in order to remain 
with Thieu and contain communism would be a lengthy process.  Perhaps his fear of 
losing everything made him support Vietnamization as a solution for the Vietnam War 
nevertheless. 
 Others advisers, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle 
Wheeler and CIA Deputy Chief William Colby, expressed grave doubts about 
Vietnamization.  When discussing troop withdrawals and negotiations with the North 
Vietnamese, Wheeler was anxious about the ability of the U.S. to successfully train the 
RVNAF.  He argued that it would take “a great deal of time to train the kinds of units, 
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and to provide the types of sophisticated equipment, that would permit these little fellows 
to stand up to the North Vietnamese.” 94  Colby stated that the Vietnamization effort 
could enable the South Vietnamese to eventually stand up to the NLF but most likely, not 
the North Vietnamese Army.  He also voiced a concern about dissent in the United States 
by pointing out that “there is a war weariness, there’s no question about it.  People are 
tired of it, and they wish it would be over.” 95 Colby recognized the pressure that Nixon 
was under to announce troop withdrawals, but he also realized that Vietnamization would 
take much too long to complete, if it were at all possible. 
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger also had his doubts about the amount 
of time the United States would be allotted to implement Vietnamization.  Although he 
appeared to agree with Nixon about the policy in 1969, in retrospect Kissinger admitted 
that their goals of building up the South’s forces and withdrawing American troops in a 
reasonable period of time would have been extremely difficult to accomplish.  In Ending 
the Vietnam War, he argued, 
Time was not on our side, and piecemeal concessions and withdrawals did 
more to encourage intransigence than compromise.  Analytically, it would have 
been better to offer the most generous possible proposal imaginable-and then, if 
rejected, to seek to impose it militarily…If we had offered at one dramatic 
moment all the concessions eventually made in three years of war, and if the 
military actions taken with steadily declining forces over 1970, 1971, and 1972, in 
Cambodia, Loas, and North Vietnam…had been undertaken all together in early 
1970, the war might well have been appreciably shortened and the final settlement 
more sustainable. 96 
In fact, the most optimistic estimate for how long Vietnamization would take was 
three years.    That is, it would take at least three years for Nixon to build up the South 
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Vietnamese forces so that they could defend themselves against the NLF and NVA 
without the United States.  This time framework would make it incredibly difficult for 
Nixon to withdraw a decent number of U.S. troops before its completion.  And Nixon had 
no intentions of dragging on the war for another three years; he felt pressured by 
American dissent to withdraw troops and conclude the war.  He also understood the 
controversy over Vietnamization within his own administration.  Nixon could have 
realized at this point that he could not have it all; he could not make the American people 
happy by withdrawing troops from Vietnam and also avoid the abandonment of the South 
Vietnamese and Nguyen Van Thieu.  Further, even if the modernization of South 
Vietnam did matter to Nixon (in order to preserve American credibility), this 
modernization became impossible because of Nixon’s other war aims.  It appears that he 
had to give up at least one of these goals in order to end the war in a timely manner.  
However, he could not accept this fact and Vietnamization became the new military 
policy in Vietnam. 
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Chapter 5: Nixon Loses the Reins 
By the end of 1970, it became clear that President Nixon and Henry Kissinger had 
abandoned all efforts to modernize South Vietnam as a capitalist and democratic state.  
Nixon also gave up on appeasing the American people, a goal he made impossible by his 
military strategy in Vietnam.  During the second half of his presidency, Nixon made 
several moves in an effort to end the war: he invaded Cambodia, continued 
Vietnamization, appealed to China, and attempted to bomb the North into negotiating on 
U.S. terms.  Vietnamization made little progress and China offered no immediate help for 
ending the war.   Fed up with failed attempts to get out of Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger 
resorted to bombing the North because they assumed that, if they could control the 
battlefield, they could gain an upper hand in negotiations.  Yet they were mistaken in 
these assumptions because regardless of the military situation, the communist forces had 
time on their side.  Finally, having exhausted all other options, Nixon and Kissinger made 
one last attempt at trying to save face by settling on a "decent interval" strategy in 
Vietnam.  All of their moves towards the end of Nixon’s presidency moved them further 
away from the economic and social modernization of Vietnam.  Thus, through his efforts 
to end the war, Nixon walkesd away from modernization plans of his predecessors. 
In a speech on November 3, 1969, Nixon explained Vietnamization to the 
American public and gained some short-lived support.  He cleverly appealed to the 
“silent majority of Americans”—the majority that, Nixon explained, did not want a quick 
withdrawal from Vietnam if it meant the devastation of the South’s democracy.97  After 
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the speech, a Gallup poll indicated that sixty-five percent of Americans approved of how 
he handled Vietnam.98  In March 1970, Nixon announced the phased withdrawal of 
150,000 troops over the next year in an attempt to prevent the massive protests that he 
feared would take place in the upcoming spring.99  Unfortunately, he made other 
decisions that only fueled these protests.  Nixon decided shortly after this speech that he 
would invade Cambodia. 
His decision was based on several motives.  It was initially prompted by the coup 
d’état of Cambodia’s neutralist Prince Sihanouk in March by the pro-American group 
headed by Prime Minister Lon Nol.  An invasion of North Vietnamese sanctuaries in 
Cambodia, a move that America had been long eager to make, would be easier with a 
pro-American leader.  When Nixon addressed the nation about the Cambodian incursion 
on April 30, he explained that the goal was to bombard North Vietnamese military supply 
lines and prevent a communist offensive.100  These goals were successful—supply lines 
were destroyed in Cambodia, forcing the communists to bring their supplies down 
alternative trails and the incursion prevented the North Vietnamese from immediately 
overrunning Cambodia.101  However, Nixon had other motives for the incursion: he 
thought that it would buy time for Vietnamization and also threaten the North 
Vietnamese into negotiations.102   
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By the end of June, Nixon withdrew from Cambodia because he neither had the 
funding nor the domestic support to train the Cambodian Army.103  The invasion of 
Cambodia ultimately had no effect on the willingness of the North Vietnamese to 
negotiate.  Further, domestic dissent caused by the Cambodian incursion proved worse 
than Nixon could have imagined.  Dissent escalated to a peak when four students at Kent 
State University and two at Jackson State College were killed by the National Guard and 
policemen at anti-war demonstrations.  Students at colleges and universities all over the 
country were in disbelief that they could be killed by speaking freely in an educational 
environment.  Thousands went on strike from their studies, often for the entire semester, 
to participate in sit-ins and demonstrations against the Vietnam War.104  Nixon gave up 
on appeasing the war dissenters and turned his attention towards Vietnamization and 
negotiations. 
 Yet, Vietnamization seemed doomed to failure from the beginning.  Despite its 
minor pressures the Cambodian incursion did not help Nixon buy time to improve the 
performance of the South Vietnamese.  In fact, it was naïve for Nixon to think that he 
could buy enough time with the incursion to actually improve Vietnamization.  As some 
of Nixon’s advisors suggested, it would take much too long for the Republic of 
Vietnam’s Armed Forces to be strengthened enough so that they could defend themselves 
against the NLF and DRV.  The RVNAF quickly became the most well-equipped army in 
the world due to U.S. support.  However, money and weapons could only do so much to 
improve the overall performance of the South’s forces.  Knowing this, the United States 
implemented an intense training program for the South Vietnamese soldiers.  However, 
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as James Willbanks points out, training the South Vietnamese proved to be “an uphill 
battle.”105  Many of the American advisors chosen for the job only offered the minimum 
effort required for training.  Further, the South Vietnamese felt insulted by the term 
“Vietnamization” and refused to fully cooperate.  They argued that they had been fighting 
in the war since the early 1950s, years before America became involved.  The idea that 
they had to “take over the burden of the fighting” offended them, especially because they 
had suffered many more casualties than the American forces overall.  Thieu also 
expressed these complaints and saw Vietnamization as a way for the Americans to 
abandon Vietnam.106 
However, Thieu may have been mistaken about this, because Vietnamization 
seemed to be Nixon’s last attempt at not abandoning Vietnam.  Theoretically, if 
Vietnamization succeeded the South Vietnamese could defend themselves, contain 
communism, and ultimately modernize as a capitalist and democratic state.  But the 
Cambodian incursion did not increase the time that Nixon had for Vietnamization—in 
fact, it might have done just the opposite.  Since the invasion caused such chaos in the 
United States, Nixon only became more pressured to withdraw troops from the war.  
Vietnamization seemed to be the last chance for the U.S. to modernize Vietnam, and 
Nixon’s decision to invade Cambodia might have secured the policy’s failure. 
While attempting Vietnamization, Nixon continued to negotiate on and off with 
the NLF, DRV, and RVN in Paris.  These negotiations made little progress because, 
while Nixon wanted a bilateral withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Willbanks,	  37.	  
106	  Willbanks,	  39-­‐41.	  
Menebhi	  54	  
	  
North persistently called for the unilateral withdrawal of American troops and the 
removal of Thieu.107  Since it seemed like Nixon and Kissinger could not come to an 
agreement with the North Vietnamese, they appealed to China for help in ending the war.  
Nixon believed his meeting with Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the PRC, in January 1972 
would prove helpful as a way to show Americans he was serious about ending the war.  
The most significant part about the negotiations with China, however, was kept secret.  
Nixon and Kissinger saw the tensions between the Soviet Union and the PRC as an 
opportunity.  Kissinger offered China a bundle of documents—satellite images of the 
location of the USSR troops.  In exchange, Enlai assured them that the PRC would help 
end the war in Vietnam.  In appealing to China for help, Nixon and Kissinger made it 
clear that the modernization of South Vietnam was no longer a consideration.  All they 
wanted by this point was to get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible.108 
More confident having gained China’s help, Nixon continued to negotiate with 
the North Vietnamese.  He believed that if he could control the battlefield, he could 
control the negotiations.  But Nixon failed to realize one critical fact: the North 
Vietnamese and NLF had time on their side.  Regardless of how long Nixon held out for 
a superior military situation, the communist forces would not negotiate until they got 
what they wanted.  Thus, for the United States, the war was inevitably lost due to the 
persistence of the North Vietnamese and NLF.  As North Vietnamese politician, Le Duc 
Tho explained to Kissinger in 1970, 
You try to strengthen the puppet troops, so they can assume responsibility 
for the war, and leave behind a large number of advisers…But we wonder 
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whether and when the puppet troops can do that.  It will take an unlimited time.  
We don’t know when, or whether, it will be done.  If it does not work, you will 
have the choice to remain in Vietnam or leave…If you prolong the war, we have 
to continue to fight…We are determined to fight until we win victory.  If our 
generation cannot win, then our sons and nephews will continue.  We will 
sacrifice everything…This is our iron will.109 
The modernization of the South might have taken decades to complete, and Nixon and 
his predecessors failed to recognize how important this war truly was to the Vietnamese.  
For the United States, losing the war meant South Vietnam would become communist 
and American credibility would suffer (for, America would have failed to “defend a free 
state”—a job to which they were fully committed).  However, losing the war for the 
Vietnamese meant losing their independence and unification as a country; something they 
had fought for since they were under French imperialistic rule.  Nixon and his 
predecessors could not win in Vietnam and their efforts to modernize the South were in 
vain. 
Nixon’s last attempt at “controlling the battlefield” occurred in late 1972 after the 
DRV balked out of negotiations that appeared to be making progress.  The “Christmas 
Bombing” dropped 158,000 tons of bombs on North Vietnamese bridges, roads, and 
railroads.110  Shortly afterwards, Zhou Enlai and Le Duc Tho met to discuss the war.  Tho 
was unaware of the secret negotiations that Nixon and Kissinger had made with the PRC, 
so he trusted Enlai’s advice.  This proved important, because Enlai’s advice might have 
very well been what ended American involvement in the Vietnam War.    In past 
negotiations, the DRV had refused to recognize Thieu’s government as legitimate and 
wanted him to resign.  This often delayed or prevented any negotiations from happening.  
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Enlai suggested that Tho should recognize Thieu in the negotiations as a part of a 
coalition government.  He stated, “It seems that the US is still willing to get out from 
Vietnam and Indochina. You should persist in principles while demonstrating flexibility 
during the negotiations. The most important [thing] is to let the Americans leave. The 
situation will change in six months or one year.”111  In other words, Enlai told Tho to 
give Nixon, Kissinger and Thieu what they want—recognize the legitimacy of Thieu 
during the negotiations.  Enlai argued that this would help them reach a settlement and 
once American troops were withdrawn, the North Vietnamese would find it much easier 
to finally achieve victory. 
This worked out perfectly because Nixon and Kissinger were just about ready to 
settle on a decent interval strategy in Vietnam.  Although the social and economic 
modernization of South Vietnam technically went out the window when Nixon became 
president, the decent interval theory would be the ultimate abandonment of any lingering 
modernization hopes.  In applying this strategy to Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger hoped 
that the U.S. could withdraw and there would be a decent interval of time before South 
Vietnam fell to communism.  This time interval would ensure that the fall of the South 
could not be blamed on the United States but instead, blamed on the inability of the South 
Vietnamese to defend themselves.  Nixon and Kissinger had been discussing “the decent 
interval” at least since August 1972.  In a conversation on August 3, Nixon said to 
Kissinger, “South Vietnam is probably never going to survive anyway.  I’m just being 
perfectly candid…can we have a viable foreign policy if a year from now or two years 
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from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam?  That’s the real question.”112  
Kissinger replied, 
If a year or two years from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South 
Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it’s the result of 
South Vietnamese incompetence…So we’ve got to find some formula that holds 
the thing together a year or two, after which—after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam 
will be a backwater.  If we settle it, say, this October, by January ’74 no one will 
give a damn.113 
The aim for a settlement in October proved to be too ambitious for all parties 
involved.  However, on January 27, 1973, the United States, North Vietnam, South 
Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (of the NLF) met in Paris to 
finally agree on a settlement in Vietnam.  This involved the complete withdrawal of all 
U.S. and other external troops in Vietnam, the future of Vietnam to be settled through an 
election, and until the election, a coalition government would consist of three equal 
powers of the PRG, GVN, and DRV.114  This agreement practically guaranteed a 
communist takeover of the South and thus, left no hope for the modernization of South 
Vietnam as a non-communist state. 
By the end of 1973, the Watergate scandal—deriving directly from Nixon’s 
paranoia and extreme measures to defend and secure his policies in Vietnam—gave him 
little power as a president and even less support from the American public.115  On August 
8, 1974, Nixon announced that he was stepping down as President of the United States.  
By the fall of 1974, the PRG and DRV clearly controlled the battlefield and it was only a 
matter of time before they completely took over the South.  Congress cut off funding to 
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the war, but eventually approved of the last $300 million to evacuate Americans and U.S. 
citizens from South Vietnam.  On April 30, 1975—much earlier than anyone, including 
the DRV and PRG had expected—Saigon crumbled in an offensive and South Vietnam 
fell to communism.116 
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Conclusion 
Despite every attempt made to modernize South Vietnam as a capitalist and 
democratic state, no U.S. administration succeeded in reaching this goal.   With that said, 
there are several interesting observations to note about how the Vietnam War began and 
ended.  First, it appears that the urgency to prove that capitalism was a dominant ideology 
over communism plunged the U.S. into the war in the first place.  Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and even Johnson sought to modernize South Vietnam because they wanted to show that 
the Western way of development would prevail.  But by the time Nixon took office, the 
social and economic development of South Vietnam mattered very little, if at all.  
Modernization may have mattered to Nixon at the beginning of his presidency, but only 
inasmuch as it helped preserve American credibility.  By the second half of his 
presidency, any plans for modernizing South Vietnam had ceased to exist. 
Second, the modernization of South Vietnam was initially sought by offering 
economic and educational assistance to Vietnam.  But in the course of the Kennedy and 
Johnson presidencies, the means by which modernization was attempted changed.  The 
ultimate goal of modernization became something that would be achieved by military 
involvement in Vietnam, rather than through economic or social assistance.  Rather than 
nation building in the South, Kennedy and Johnson began to follow this flawed logic: if 
the U.S. can simply contain communism in the North, then the South can remain 
capitalist and democratic, which would lead to a Western modernization of the South.  
What they failed to understand was that communism could not be contained. 
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Third, regardless of how each administration justified the modernization of South 
Vietnam, one fact remains true: U.S. time in Vietnam was limited. The DRV and NLF 
would fight for as long as it took to gain their independence and freedom, while the 
United States had to eventually withdraw.  As Ho Chi Minh exclaimed in 1966,  
If by ‘final victory’ you mean the departure of the Americans, then we will 
fight to final victory.  Everything depends on the Americans.  If they want to 
make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years.  If they want 
to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to tea afterwards.117 
Finally, and most importantly, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon failed 
to confront the reality of the historical, military, and political circumstances in Vietnam 
and all colonized countries.  Rostow and other contributors to the Modernization School 
Theory further increased this misunderstanding.  They held a simplified and naïve 
understanding of what it would take for a formerly colonized country to develop.  They 
thought that South Vietnam could be easily modernized as a capitalist and democratic 
country—and in a grossly underestimated amount of time.  These assumptions caused the 
longest war in American history and a domestic divide that had never occurred before, 
and has not since been replicated. 
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